


Can Context Influence Discontinuity Outcomes?

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The Nature of Institutional Change

OVERWHELMINGLY INCREMENTAL

- New Institutional Economics (North, Williamson, Mahoney/Thelen)
- Embedded Autonomy (Evans, O'Donnell)
- Hall/Taylor
- Shepsle
- Weber
- Putnam
- Gourevitch
- Acharya

PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIA

- North/Wallis/Weingast “Comparatively rapid”
- Goldstone
- Chenoweth/Stephan
- Goodwin
- Migdal
- Pinckney
- Finnemore
- Fukuyama
- Mandelbaum



Range of Analysis

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

- Excluding “microstate” islands (lack of comparability)
- From independence (mostly ca. 1960) to present
- Excludes country-years when civil war meant no effective government existed
 - But does include country-years with local and/or isolated insurrections, i.e. Mozambique

DISCONTINUITY DEFINED

“any interruption in the continuity of government – which could be attributable to coup, revolution, insurrection, invasion, or autogolpe.”

- Not disaggregated by type (cf. Acemoglu & Robinson elite vs non-elite)
- Excludes *planned* transitions, i.e. democratizations



Why Coups?

Autocratic governments have no systemic means for replacement of leadership.

- Coups in many cases are the most viable means of accountability
- Other forms of abrupt transition are uncommon (creates a small n problem)

Hirschman: political action more likely when exit [i.e. emigration] and voice [i.e. protest] are unavailable

Fukuyama: demand for state performance is the single most significant factor for whether that performance happens

Lipset: governmental legitimacy is derived from effectiveness.



Why Coups in Africa?

Egypt 1952	Central African Rep. 1969	Chad 1976	Kenya 1982	Djibouti 1991	Sierra Leone 1996	Sudan 2008	Burkina Faso 2016
Sudan 1958	Sudan 1969	Sudan 1976	Upper Volta 1982	Lesotho 1991	Central African Rep. 1996	Mauritania 2008	Zimbabwe 2017
Sudan 1959	Mali 1969	Burundi 1976	Ghana 1982	Mali 1991	Sierra Leone 1997	Guinea-Bissau 2008	Equatorial Guinea 2017
Sudan 1959	Libya 1969	Benin 1977	Central African Rep. 1983	Cote d'Ivoire 1991	Congo-Brazzaville 1997	Guinea-Bissau 2008	Gabon 2019
Congo-Kinshasa 1960	Somalia 1969	Ethiopia 1977	Equatorial Guinea 1983	Comoros 1991	Zambia 1997	Guinea 2008	Ethiopia 2019
Ethiopia 1960	Congo-Brazzaville 1969	Ethiopia 1977	Ghana 1983	Togo 1991	Guinea-Bissau 1998	Equatorial Guinea 2009	Sudan 2019 (pictured)
Somalia 1961	Dahomey 1969	Sudan 1977	Upper Volta 1983	Togo 1991	Comoros 1999	Lesotho 2009	Mali 2020
Ghana 1962	Lesotho 1970	Congo-Brazzaville 1977	Niger 1983	Chad 1991	Guinea-Bissau 1999	Guinea-Bissau 2009	Central African Republic 2021
Senegal 1962	Congo-Brazzaville 1970	Chad 1977	Nigeria 1983	Togo 1991	Cote d'Ivoire 1999	Niger 2010	Niger 2021
Togo 1963	Sudan 1970	Angola 1977	Guinea 1984	Togo 1991	Comoros 2000	Guinea-Bissau 2010	Guinea 2021
Congo-Brazzaville 1963	Togo 1970	Ghana 1977	Cameroon 1984	Chad 1992	Cote d'Ivoire 2000	Madagascar 2010	Sudan 2021
Dahomey 1963	Guinea 1970	Comoros 1977	Swaziland 1984	Burundi 1992	Guinea-Bissau 2000	D. R. Congo 2011	Sudan 2021
Tanzania 1964	Uganda 1971	Mali 1978	Mauritania 1984	Sierra Leone 1992	Djibouti 2000	Guinea 2011	Sudan 2021
Gabon 1964	Sierra Leone 1971	Somalia 1978	Sudan 1985	Benin 1992	Cote d'Ivoire 2001	Guinea-Bissau 2011	Burkina Faso 2022
Algeria 1965	Morocco 1971	Comoros 1978	Guinea 1985	Chad 1992	Burundi 2001	Mali 2012	Guinea-Bissau 2022
Burundi 1965	Sudan 1971	Ghana 1978	Uganda 1985	Madagascar 1992	Central African Rep. 2001	Guinea-Bissau 2012	
Zaire 1965	Chad 1971	Mauritania 1978	Nigeria 1985	Comoros 1992	Burundi 2001	Mali 2012	
Dahomey 1965	Ghana 1972	Guinea-Bissau 1978	Sudan 1985	Sierra Leone 1992	Central African Rep. 2003	Guinea-Bissau 2012	
Central African Rep. 1966	Congo-Brazzaville 1972	Ghana 1979	Liberia 1985	Chad 1993	Mauritania 2003	Eritrea 2013	
Upper Volta 1966	Dahomey 1972	Ghana 1979	Lesotho 1986	Burundi 1993	Guinea-Bissau 2003	Egypt 2013	
Nigeria 1966	Morocco 1972	Equatorial Guinea 1979	Equatorial Guinea 1986	Burundi 1993	D. R. Congo 2004	South Sudan 2013	
Ghana 1966	Dahomey 1972	Central African Empire 1979	Togo 1986	Libya 1993	D. R. Congo 2004	Central African Rep. 2013	
Burundi 1966	Rwanda 1973	Mauritania 1980	Sierra Leone 1987	Nigeria 1993	Togo 2005	D. R. Congo 2013	
Nigeria 1966	Lesotho 1974	Liberia 1980	Burundi 1987	Burundi 1994	Mauritania 2005	Lesotho 2014	
Togo 1966	Uganda 1974	Liberia 1980	Burkina Faso 1987	Gambia 1994	Guinea 2006	Gambia 2014	
Burundi 1966	Niger 1974	Uganda 1980	Tunisia 1987	Lesotho 1994	Chad 2006	Burundi 2015	
Sudan 1966	Ethiopia 1974	Liberia 1980	Comoros 1987	Liberia 1994	Chad 2006	Burkina Faso 2015	
Togo 1967	Ethiopia 1974	Tanzania 1980	Benin 1988	Liberia 1994	Chad 2008		
Sierra Leone 1967	Central African Rep. 1974	Zambia 1980	Somalia 1988	Liberia 1994			
Ghana 1967	Madagascar 1974	Guinea-Bissau 1980	Chad 1989	Gambia 1994			
Algeria 1967	Dahomey 1975	Upper Volta 1980	Ethiopia 1989	Gambia 1995			
Dahomey 1967	Chad 1975	Cote d'Ivoire 1980	Sudan 1989	Comoros 1995			
Congo-Brazzaville 1968	Nigeria 1975	Mauritania 1981	Madagascar 1989	Sierra Leone 1995			
Sierra Leone 1968	Comoros 1975	Equatorial Guinea 1981	Nigeria 1990	Cote d'Ivoire 1995			
Congo-Brazzaville 1968	Sudan 1975	Equatorial Guinea 1981	Madagascar 1990	Cote d'Ivoire 1995			
Congo-Brazzaville 1968	Uganda 1975	Gambia 1981	Zambia 1990	Benin 1995			
Congo-Brazzaville 1968	Mozambique 1975	Central African Rep. 1981	Sudan 1990	Sierra Leone 1996			
Mali 1968	Nigeria 1976	Ghana 1981	Sudan 1990	Niger 1996			
Equatorial Guinea 1969	Nigeria 1976	Mauritania 1982	Mauritania 1990	Guinea 1996			
	Niger 1976	Chad 1982	Chad 1990	Burundi 1996			



Independent Variables


Economic Factors

- GDP Per Capita
 - Absolute
 - 3-year average
 - YOY change
 - Normalized to neighborhood
- Foreign Assistance
 - Normalized to GDP
 - Normalized to Population
- Regime Type (binary D/D)
- Regime Tenure
- Trust in Government (via corruption perception)
- Urbanization
- Cold War Ongoingness
- ~~Resource Curse (few instances pre-2000... maybe)~~
- ~~Decentralized Armed Forces (rarely observed)~~
- ~~Education and Health Metrics (long-term)~~



“Political Order Cannot Be Treated As A Given”

Robert Bates (2008)




Data Quality

TONIGHT'S NUMBERS ARE...

Datasets, even from the World Bank, are often:

- incomplete
- reliant on national data that may be inaccurate (due to inadequate capacity) or manipulated (due to autocratic mandates)

Missing data points excluded from calculation, not imputed (due to volatility)



Analysis


STATISTICAL CONCERNS

Autocorrelation: Wooldridge F-score 2.196 (0.1455) does not require action, but still higher than ideal

Heteroskedasticity: Every variable off the charts

Collinearity: Some collinear relationships

- Assistance:GDP higher when regime tenure is low
- Assistance Per Capita higher when regime tenure is high (small n) and higher in democracies
- Urbanization and neighborhood-normalized GDP per capita
- Cold War vs Autocracy (1/3 more likely)
- GDP per capita and longevity



The Big Table o' Numbers

<u>Factor</u>	<u>Relationship</u>	<u>Significance</u>	<u>R-square</u>
Cold War ongoing	+0.05 during CW	***	0.0083
Regime type	+0.06 if autocratic	***	0.0121
Regime durability	-0.002 per year	***	0.0113
Corruption	+0.0009 per .01	***	0.0055
GDP Per Capita	-0.0012 per \$100	***	0.0065
GDP PC 1st diff	-0.0076 per 10% chg	*	0.0024
GDP PC relative	-0.0026 per 10% var	***	0.0055
Urbanization	-0.0012 per 1% chg	***	0.0060
Assistance Per Capita	-0.018 per \$100	*	0.0018
Assistance to GDP	+0.0008 per 1%	**	0.0036

Preliminary Conclusions

SOME THINGS MATTER...

Factors within regime's control do affect the likelihood of its downfall

- But note “[temporally] roving bandit”

... BUT NOT VERY MUCH

None of these will “make or break” a regime

Coups remain contingent events

SO IN SUM:

Empirical factors can establish a risk assessment

Qualitative observation of local factors may provide additional insight



Feedback Sought

METHODOLOGICAL

Experiential observations with similar data

Believable, complete data sources

Expansion of approach to many:many

THEORETICAL

Additional consequential factors to consider

Applicability of the Resource Curse (Oil, Cacao, Coffee, Minerals)



Can Context Influence Discontinuity Outcomes?

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